"The American republic now extended across a third of a continent, and was unlikely to stop there. How then could the British time bomb of generosity--the ocean of land ceded in 1783--fail to revive familiar protests of "no taxation without representation"? Where, if that happened, would Hamilton's "UNION" be? Madison solved these issues of time and space by shifting scale. In doing so he drew, knowingly or not, 65 on Machiavelli. For only in republics, the Florentine had observed, could the "common good" be "looked to properly." By expanding the number who benefited, the influence of the few who didn't could be reduced: not all parts, submerged in wholes, need drown. 66 Scale could be the life preserver. There were, Madison acknowledged, dangers in this: By enlarging too much the number of electors [voters], you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. But surely there existed "a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie." In this way balancing factions--a Burkean enterprise--could put "inconveniences" to good use: Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. The proposed Constitution "forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures." 67"