In 1997, executives at Disney came to us with a request: Could we make Toy Story 2 as a direct-to-video release--that is, not release it in theaters? At the time, Disney's suggestion made a lot of sense. In its history, the studio had only released one animated sequel in theaters, 1990's The Rescuers Down Under, and it had been a flop. In the years since, the direct-to-video market had become extremely lucrative, so when Disney proposed Toy Story 2 for video release only--a niche product with a lower artistic bar--we said yes. While we questioned the quality of most sequels made for the video market, we thought that we could do better. Right away, we realized that we'd made a terrible mistake. Everything about the project ran counter to what we believed in. We didn't know how to aim low. We had nothing against the direct-to-video model, in theory; Disney was doing it and making heaps of money. We just couldn't figure out how to go about it without sacrificing quality. What's more, it soon became clear that scaling back our expectations to make a direct-to-video product was having a negative impact on our internal culture, in that it created an A-team (A Bug's Life) and a B-team (Toy Story 2). The crew assigned to work on Toy Story 2 was not interested in producing B-level work, and more than a few came into my office to say so.