"Despite these criticisms of his criticisms, my stance has a major problem, one that causes Morse to conclude that the contributions of neuroscience to the legal system "are modest at best and neuroscience poses no genuine, radical challenges to concepts of personhood, responsibility, and competence."25 The problem can be summarized in a hypothetical exchange: Prosecutor: So, professor, you've told us about the extensive damage that the defendant sustained to his frontal cortex when he was a child. Has every person who has sustained such damage become a multiple murderer, like the defendant? Neuroscientist testifying for the defense: No. Prosecutor: Has every such person at least engaged in some sort of serious criminal behavior? Neuroscientist: No. Prosecutor: Can brain science explain why the same amount of damage produced murderous behavior in the defendant? Neuroscientist: No. The problem is that, even amid all these biological insights that allow us to be snitty about those silly homunculi, we still can't predict much about behavior. Perhaps at the statistical level of groups, but not when it comes to individuals."